Ghana’s flagship Gold‑for‑Reserves (G4R) programme, an initiative designed to convert domestic gold into foreign currency reserves, has found itself at the centre of a fierce policy debate after the International Monetary Fund (IMF) reported an accounting loss of about US$214 million linked to the scheme by the end of September 2025.
The IMF’s findings, laid out in its Fifth Review of Ghana’s Extended Credit Facility programme, highlight that losses from artisanal and small‑scale mining gold transactions, along with fees tied to Ghana Gold Board (GoldBod) operations, drove the deficit. The Fund also warned that the program’s rapid expansion exposes the Bank of Ghana (BoG) to “significant downside risks” if not properly managed.
But beyond the cold numbers lies a contentious narrative; one in which supporters of the programme argue that the reported “loss” fails to capture its broader economic contribution. Proponents assert that the initiative, by mobilising gold from informal markets and channelling it into official export pathways, has been a crucial tool for building foreign reserves, stabilising the cedi and curbing smuggling.
At a press briefing, BoG Governor Dr Johnson Pandit Asiama acknowledged the substantial financial toll of the programme but maintained that its benefits extend beyond the headline figure. While specifics of his remarks centred on stabilisation efforts, officials stress that the strategy has played a role in shoring up reserves amidst challenging macroeconomic headwinds.
GoldBod’s Chief Executive, Sammy Gyamfi, has been particularly vocal in defending the programme’s outcomes. In early January 2026, he promised a detailed exposé to clarify public concerns and reject characterisations of the reported losses as evidence of mismanagement.
GoldBod has also argued that the G4R initiative has generated more than US$10.8 billion in foreign exchange inflows from artisanal and small‑scale mining exports in 2025; a figure that dwarfs the reported cost. The board’s position is that the “loss” effectively represents a strategic cost to secure much larger economic gains, including stronger forex reserves and reduced dependence on external borrowing.
Critics, however, are unconvinced. Some opposition lawmakers and policy analysts have seized on the IMF figure as evidence of weak oversight and poor pricing strategy. Doubts have been raised about high fees paid to middlemen, transport and security costs, and whether gold was bought close to world spot prices without securing commensurate returns on export.
Civil society voices have likewise called for greater transparency, with some groups threatening legal action over delays in disclosing detailed programme data.
Amid the back‑and‑forth, the Bank of Ghana has signalled a willingness to engage further with the IMF and allow external audits to unpack the accounting differences and reconcile reported losses with the broader economic impact. The review is intended to clarify whether the figures reflect genuine financial costs or the inevitable by‑products of a policy purposefully designed to yield strategic reserve accumulation and macroeconomic stability.
Author: Edem Latsu Nukafu
Edem Latsu Nukafu, a passionate communications professional dedicated to public relations, journalism, media strategy, and content development. He holds both a Diploma and Bachelor of Arts Degree in Communication Studies (Public Relations) from the University of Media, Arts and Communication – UniMAC-IJ. A member of Ghana Journalists Association (GJA).
