The ongoing dispute between South Africa and the rest of the sub-Saharan segment of the continent over immigration and the treatment of African migrants has increasingly spilled over from the diplomatic sphere into the corporate sector, creating risks for South African businesses operating in other countries across the continent and raising concerns about the future of economic relations between its companies operating beyond its borders and the countries within the continent which host them.
The immediate trigger has been the wave of anti-immigrant protests, vigilante actions and alleged xenophobic attacks in parts of South Africa during 2026, which has prompted the voluntary repatriation of thousands of Africans from other countries on the continent and the desire of even more to return home. Several African governments – such as those of Ghana and Nigeria – have accused South Africa of failing to adequately protect foreign nationals. But South Africa insists it has condemned unlawful attacks and is addressing immigration concerns through legal channels – although increasingly, with local government elections approaching, several South African officials have made statements aimed at placating, rather than condemning protestors, insisting that most of the African immigrants in question have been residing there illegally.
The implications of the ongoing immigration tensions involving South Africa and citizens of other African countries extend well beyond migration policy. Even when disputes originate with government enforcement actions, public protests, deportations, or anti-immigrant campaigns, they inevitably affect the operating environment for South African companies across the continent. The consequences are particularly significant in West, East, Central and Southern Africa, where many of South Africa’s largest multinational corporations have built extensive investments over the past three decades.
Corporate reputation risks
The most immediate impact is reputational. Many Africans outside South Africa increasingly struggle to separate the actions of the South African state, local political actors, or anti-immigrant groups from the activities of South African corporations operating in their countries.
Companies such as MTN Group, MultiChoice Group, Shoprite Holdings, Standard Bank Group, Absa Group, Pick n Pay and Vodacom Group have spent years cultivating local identities in host markets. However, periods of heightened anti-foreigner sentiment in South Africa often trigger public calls for boycotts of South African brands elsewhere on the continent.
Although large-scale consumer boycotts have historically had limited success, they can damage brand perception, reduce customer loyalty and increase operating costs through the need for public relations campaigns and stakeholder engagement.
More assertive regulatory scrutiny
Government regulators in host countries are also likely to become more assertive toward South African firms.
In normal circumstances, regulatory agencies evaluate companies primarily on commercial and legal grounds. During periods of diplomatic tension, however, regulators may face domestic political pressure to demonstrate that foreign firms are not receiving preferential treatment.
This does not necessarily result in overt discrimination, but South African firms may encounter greater scrutiny of tax compliance, more rigorous competition and antitrust reviews, tougher local-content requirements, increased pressure to localize management positions and delays in licensing, permit renewals or regulatory approvals.
In countries where public sentiment becomes particularly hostile, politicians will find it politically advantageous to adopt tougher positions toward highly visible South African businesses.
Where the situation is already precarious, negative public sentiment may become the tipping point. For instance, already, South African gold mining company Gold Fields has been caught up in mining lease renewal disputes with the Government of Ghana that preceded the ongoing immigration dispute. The Government of Ghana refused to renew Gold Fields’ mining lease at Damang due to the company’s failure to declare verifiable mineral reserves and its lack of a detailed technical and budgetary program for exploration. As a result, the state assumed operational control of the Damang mine and has since given the license to Engineers & Planners, an indigenously owned firm. Goldfields operations at the much larger Tarkwa mine are ongoing, but the government has firmly ruled out an automatic lease renewal before its 2027 expiration as the government is subjecting the Tarkwa lease—which produces around US$1 billion in annual gold output—to stricter conditions insisting the company submit detailed development plans that explicitly demonstrate commitments to local value creation, technology transfer, and community development
Increased political risk
Many South African multinationals depend heavily on government relationships throughout Africa.
Telecommunications operators require spectrum licenses and regulatory approvals. Banks require central bank authorization. Retail chains depend on investment permits, land approvals and customs arrangements.
When immigration disputes generate diplomatic tensions, corporate-government relations can become more complicated. Even where governments remain committed to protecting investors, political leaders may become less willing to publicly support South African commercial interests if doing so risks domestic backlash. The result is a gradual increase in political risk rather than sudden expropriation or outright hostility.
Another likely consequence relating to political risk is the strengthening of economic nationalism. Political groups in several African countries may use the immigration dispute to argue that local businesses deserve greater protection from South African competition.
Arguments may emerge that South African firms dominate key sectors and their profits are being repatriated rather than reinvested locally. Economic nationalists will further argue that local entrepreneurs face disadvantages when competing against larger South African corporations and that reciprocity is lacking when African migrants face difficulties in South Africa.
Such narratives can resonate particularly strongly among unemployed youth and local business associations.
The rumblings of discontent
Already angry stakeholder and pressure groups are making their displeasure felt all around sub-Saharan Africa.
West Africa contains some of South Africa’s most important markets, particularly Ghana and Nigeria. The region has traditionally embraced regional mobility through the framework of Economic Community of West African States. Consequently, immigration disputes involving deportations or restrictions tend to attract strong political and public reactions.
South African businesses in the region are already facing heightened public criticism, greater demands for localization, more intense activist engagement by trade unions and civil society groups, as well as increased political pressure on regulators. However, governments are unlikely to jeopardize major investments because telecommunications, banking and retail sectors contribute significantly to employment and tax revenues
East African countries have similarly increasingly positioned themselves as champions of regional integration through the East African Community. Therefore, governments in countries such as Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania have become more vocal in criticizing restrictive migration practices where their citizens are significantly affected.
East African regulators could place greater emphasis on reciprocity when dealing with South African investors, although, like with their West African counterparts, outright punitive action remains unlikely.
But in Central Africa, particularly countries where South African mining, banking and telecommunications interests are significant, tensions could complicate investment negotiations. Countries such as Democratic Republic of the Congo already exhibit strong resource-nationalist tendencies. Immigration disputes may reinforce demands for greater local participation in sectors where South African capital is prominent.
The greatest complexity lies within the southern African region itself.
The principles of regional integration promoted by Southern African Development Community are difficult to reconcile with large-scale deportations or anti-immigrant rhetoric. Neighbouring countries such as Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Lesotho and Malawi have deep economic ties with South Africa and provide substantial migrant labour flows.
Although governments are unlikely to retaliate directly against South African investors, public pressure could intensify if repatriations continue or expand.
The immigration dispute also creates challenges for the broader goals of the African Continental Free Trade Area which seeks not only to facilitate trade but also to encourage investment, business mobility and deeper economic integration across the continent.
Many African policymakers argue that it becomes difficult to promote a truly integrated continental market when restrictions on the movement of African people appear inconsistent with commitments to freer movement of goods, services and capital.
As a result, South African companies are increasingly finding themselves drawn into debates that are fundamentally political rather than commercial.
What may happen next
Over the next 12 to 24 months, the most likely scenario is not a wholesale rejection of South African investment but a gradual deterioration in goodwill.
Three trends are likely.
One is that South African firms will intensify localization efforts, emphasizing local employment, local procurement and community investment in the African jurisdictions they have already expanded into. The second is that African host governments will continue welcoming South African capital while simultaneously subjecting it to closer regulatory scrutiny. And the third is that public sentiment will remain volatile, meaning that future immigration incidents in South Africa could quickly trigger calls for consumer boycotts, protests or tougher treatment of South African companies.
Overall, South African multinationals are unlikely to lose their strategic importance across Africa. Their investments remain deeply embedded in banking, telecommunications, retail, mining and media sectors. However, the political and social “license to operate” that these companies have long enjoyed is becoming more fragile. Unless immigration tensions are eased through diplomacy and more coordinated regional migration policies, South African corporations may increasingly find themselves bearing costs for disputes they neither created nor directly control.
